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Early Christian Creeds and
Controversies in the Light of the
Orality–Literacy Hypothesis
Thomas J. Farrell
The orality-literacy hypothesis developed in the largely 
complementary works of Walter J. Ong, S.J., and Eric A. Havelock 
grows out of the fi eld research of Milman Parry (1971). Better than 
half a century ago, Parry initiated the investigation into the composing 
practices of completely non-literate Yugoslav singers of stories that 
culminated in the landmark publication of The Singer of Tales by 
Albert B. Lord (1960).1 One of the central claims Ong and Havelock 
make in their formulation of the orality-literacy hypothesis is that the 
primary oral mentality is characterized by concrete thinking, while the 
literate mentality is characterized by abstract thinking. Coincidentally, 
the fi eld research conducted by A. R. Luria (1976) better than half a 
century ago concerning the cognitive development of completely non-
literate peasants and peasants who had participated in a literacy program 
corroborates this claim of the orality-literacy hypothesis.2 In Ong’s 
formulation of the orality-literacy hypothesis, he also notes that the 
primary oral mentality, and even the residually oral mentality of people 
who have acquired but who have not yet fully interiorized literacy and 
literate modes of thought, are characterized by formulary expressions.
Now these two major tenets of the orality-literacy hypothesis 
enable us to understand more fully than ever before the nature of the 
formulary and concrete expressions employed in the early Christian 
creeds and the nature of the Arian and the Pneumatomachian controversies 
over the abstract term homoousios in the Nicene Creed of 325 and in 
the Niceno-Constantinopolitan Creed of 381, respectively. The former 
controversy involved the
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consubstantiality of the Son with the Father, the latter the consubstantiality 
of the Holy Spirit with the Father and the Son. Both controversies 
involved a clash between the primary oral mentality and the literate 
mentality, but, as I hope to show, these clashes arose within the context 
of composing credal statements in accord with the dictates of the primary 
oral mentality. This essay proceeds through six points: (1) a discussion 
of key characteristics of primary orality and vowelized literacy, (2) a 
summary of J. N. D. Kelly’s standard history of Early Christian Creeds 
(1972), (3) a close analysis of the largely oral character of the Greek text 
of the Creed of 325, (4) an analysis of the Arian controversy surrounding 
the Creed of 325, (5) an analysis of the Pneumatomachian controversy 
over the amendments added to the Creed of 381, and (6) some closing 
refl ections about these investigations.
From the basic insights of Parry and Lord about the use of 
formulas, formulaic elements, and themes in oral poetry, Ong moves to 
the large claim that all verbal discourse in primary oral cultures and in 
residual forms of primary oral culture is largely formulary in nature. He 
implies that the formulary expressions which E. R. Curtius discussed 
in European Literature and the Latin Middle Ages (1953) should be 
considered as oral residue in the sense of carryovers into writing of 
ways of thinking or expressing thought formulated before writing 
was invented and then perpetuated by writing itself until around the 
latter part of the eighteenth century (1971:255-83). He notes that the 
commonplaces of rhetoric—the kind of sayings Erasmus collected in 
his Adages—are formulary in nature.3 Ong infers that thought had to be 
formulary in order to be remembered by highly oral people—not just the 
auditors, but also the composers themselves. For if the thought were not 
expressed in a formulary manner, it just simply would not be retained. 
This is an extremely important point to bear in mind with respect to the 
formulation of the early Christian creeds.
Havelock makes a second important point about the primary oral 
mentality that needs to be borne in mind. Oral discourse was attentive to 
the sensory (the concrete) and was more disposed to describing actions 
than to creating abstractions because people hearing what was said or 
sung could feel and follow concrete actions. Havelock repeatedly says 
that primary oral language is imagistic; Northrop Frye in effect says 
that primary oral language is metaphorical; and Ong says in Orality and 
Literacy (1982) that
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primary oral language involves concrete operational thinking; these 
three phenomenological accounts of the primary oral mentality are 
complementary, not competitive; therefore, their various descriptions 
can be used interchangeably. Primary oral people, Havelock points out, 
could not see or hear or taste categories, classes, relationships, principles, 
or axioms, and A. R. Luria’s (1976) fi eld research bears him out on these 
points. Oral tradition, according to Havelock, did not analyze history in 
terms of cause and effect, factors and forces, objectives and infl uences, 
and the like because these analytical processes were not amenable to 
the psychodymamics of memory upon which primary oral thought and 
expression are based.
Now Karl Barth says in Dogmatics in Outline that “the Bible 
is not a philosophical book, but. . . the book of God’s mighty acts . . .” 
(1959:38). Barth here is not making so much a theological point, as 
he thinks he is, as a literary-anthropological one with considerable 
theological consequences. For he is in effect saying that the Bible comes 
out of a primary oral tradition. Even though the material in the Bible 
obviously was written down, the writing, I have suggested (Farrell 1986), 
largely transcribed primary oral patterns of thought and expression, and 
rightly so, for what was written was obviously intended to be read aloud 
later. Frye makes virtually the same points as Barth in The Great Code 
(1981:27):
There are no true rational arguments in the Bible, not even in the 
New Testament, which despite its late date keeps very close to the 
Old Testament in its attitude towards language. What may look like 
rational argument, such as the Epistle to the Hebrews, turns out on 
closer analysis to be a disguised form of exhortation. Nor is there 
much functional use of abstraction. Biblical Hebrew is an almost 
obsessively concrete language, and while there are a few abstract 
terms like “nature” in the New Testament, they hardly affect what is 
still a metaphorical structure.
According to Havelock, the rational argumentation of philosophy, 
which Barth and Frye allude to, comes out of the development of 
vowelized phonetic alphabetic writing. Of course, the primary oral data 
of the Bible can be subjected to the refl ection and abstract analysis of 
literate thought. If this were done, it would involve expressing in explicit 
abstract language what
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is implicit in the imagistic language of the Bible. If this were done, for 
example, with the threefold naming in the baptismal formula treated 
later in this essay, then one might use the concrete term prosopon or 
“person” to refer to each of the three distinct parties named therein.4 
Or one might use the rather abstract philosophic term homoousios or 
“consubstantial” to refer to the oneness of the three parties named in the 
baptismal formula. But the important points to note for the present are 
that early writing is largely a transcription of primary oral thought and 
expression and that truly literate thought develops gradually with the 
development of philosophy in ancient Greece.
The gradualness of this development comes home most clearly 
in Havelock’s magisterial account of The Greek Concept of Justice: 
From Its Shadow in Homer to Its Substance in Plato (1978), which 
happens to illustrate nicely the above-mentioned point about making 
explicit in abstract language what is implicit in imagistic language; for 
Plato’s concept of justice makes explicit the concept of justice that is 
implicit in Homer. As a matter of fact, a review of the etymologies of 
many abstract terms reveals that they began as rather concrete terms and 
then gradually took on more abstract meaning, and I would attribute this 
transformation to what Ong describes as the interiorization of literacy 
and literate thought. Because this point is important for my later analysis 
of Arianism, I would mention here that Lev S. Vygotsky (1962) claims 
that the word meanings in the thinking of children in the literate culture 
he was studying change just as they had changed historically, from 
relatively concrete referents to gradually more abstract terms (73, 124). 
The point is that literacy and the development of literate thought proceed 
by degrees, so to speak. That is, becoming literate involves more that 
just acquiring the basic rudiments of reading and writing a vowelized 
form of phonetic alphabetic literacy. While abstract literate thought did 
not develop with all-consonant Semitic alphabet, as Havelock points 
out in The Literate Revolution in Greece and its Cultural Consequences 
(1982), the Yahwist quality in the Bible that Herbert N. Schneidau 
variously calls self-criticism, demythologizing, and distanciation 
probably emerged with the development of the all-consonant Semitic 
alphabet, because this quality is not common in primary oral culture 
without some form of phonetic alphabetic writing (cf. Farrell 1987). Of 
course, it is true, as Havelock and Vygotsky indicate, that terms which 
come out of the concrete thinking of
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primary orality found in the Yahwist or in the early Christian tradition 
can take on abstract meaning over the centuries as they are appropriated 
for literary use, as has happened with the concept of person (cf. Rahner 
1970:301-2).
Before we turn to considering the formulation of the early 
Christian creeds as such, let us briefl y consider that part of the Bible on 
which they are based in the light of the two points we just noted about 
orality. The sayings of Jesus Christ are obviously formulary expressions, 
and his parables probably should be considered to be formulary in a certain 
way, as Kelber (1983) suggests, although I am not going to try to develop 
this point here. His acts of healing, exorcizing, teaching, and debating 
are obviously action-oriented deeds, and his birth, active life, passion, 
death, resurrection, and ascension all clearly involve acts or events. In 
other words, the features of his life recorded in the accounts we have are 
in harmony with the orientation of the primary oral mentality, whereas 
accounts of his subjective state of consciousness or his thoughts would 
not be. Now, one of these accounts ends with the well-known rhetorical 
fi gure of speech that the account is not exhaustive in its treatment of 
the things Jesus Christ did (Jn. 21.25). No other account is exhaustive 
either, nor are all the accounts considered together exhaustive. Each 
account is selective, and each account selects presumably important 
things about Jesus Christ to pass on. (This selecting process involves a 
kind of abstracting, but so does all narrative; consequently, literacy may 
not be in play here. The product in the case of the four gospels is still not 
abstract philosophic statement, and this is still essentially the case with 
the other New Testament writings.) But even if we grant the importance 
of the things recorded in the New Testament writings, we would have 
to grant that there is a lot of material there to be remembered in, say, 
the living human memory of prospective converts. Consequently, just 
as the composers of the New Testament writings had to select salient 
points from the life of Jesus Christ, so too the followers of Jesus Christ 
needed to select salient points-to-repeat, in order fi rst to attract and then 
to instruct prospective converts to the new faith. Moreover, they had to 
formulate these salient points in formulary expressions and in action-
oriented language. Of course, the new members of the faith might later 
expand their knowledge of the life of Jesus Christ, but it probably was 
best for them to begin with the most prominent points fi rst and then pick 
up the details later. It is important to
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recall that many of the prospective converts were not literate and that 
even those who were literate to some degree were still highly oral in 
their thinking.
With these considerations in mind, let us now turn to Kelly’s 
careful account of the diverse background activities that contributed to 
the formulation of the Nicene Creed in 325. We begin with a brief review 
of the creeds and then move to some background information. Kelly 
(1972:296) points out that the creed now known to ordinary Christians 
as the Nicene Creed is misnamed. For the Nicene Creed of 325 (as it is 
designated in this essay) was not only reaffi rmed, but also amended and 
expanded at the Council of Constantinople in 381. This amended creed 
has been considered authoritative in Christianity in the East and the West 
alike from the time of the Council of Chalcedon in 451. Kelly says that 
the Apostles’ Creed of the fi fth century is “purely Western” (296) and 
“has no place in the liturgy of the Eastern Orthodox churches” (368), 
and he further notes that it is a rather elaborate variant of the Old Roman 
Creed which precedes the Nicene Creed of 325. The Old Roman Creed 
itself emerged gradually from the catechetical setting in which people 
were instructed in the faith preceding baptism. Declaratory creeds were 
“. . .pronounced before the candidate actually entered the baptistry and 
came to the water” (40), whereas interrogatory creeds, which proceeded 
by question and answer, were part of the baptismal rite as such. Here is 
how Kelly explains this complex situation (49):
The double recital of creeds, one declaratory and one interrogatory, 
has always been something of an anomaly. The explanation is 
that the declaratory creed was really bound up with the ritual of 
the tradition and rendition of the creed, and this logically cohered 
with the catechumenate, not with the baptism itself. The only creed 
properly belonging to the baptism as such was the interrogatory 
one.
He goes on to note that the declaratory creed belongs “. . . to the second 
generation of the third century at the earliest” (49) and that the declaratory 
creeds borrowed in large measure from the baptismal interrogations; 
he points out that there is no trace of declaratory creeds in the early 
liturgies, although they eventually became a standard part of Christian 
liturgies.
Given this brief overview of the history, let us now consider
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these expressions of the faith with respect to the psychodynamics of 
primary orality. The language Kelly uses to describe the catechetical 
instruction repeatedly accentuates the formulary nature of the credal 
expressions of the faith: “It is obvious that teachers must always have 
felt the need for concise summaries, approximating as closely as 
possible to formulae. . .” (50). It would be tedious to list all the times 
that Kelly uses the terms “formula(e),” “formulary,” “stereotyped,” and 
the like, but we may note that he uses such terms on the average of about 
once a page without saying anything explicit about the primary oral 
mentality. Unlike Kelly, we can now understand the psychodynamics 
involved in instructing highly oral people: if the expressions of the faith 
were not formulary, they simply would not have been remembered by 
the catechumens, who, for the most part, were from a residual form of 
primary oral culture. (For that matter, so were the educated converts, 
although by virtue of their education they probably were literate to some 
degree.) It is also worth pointing out that as the expressions of the faith 
lengthened, they followed a narrative (that is, action-oriented) pattern 
and generally used straightforward paratactic or additive linguistic 
structures rather than elaborate structures of subordination. As noted 
above, the narrative approach, as distinct from the approach of what Frye 
calls rational argumentation, would be in tune with the orientation of the 
primary oral mentality, and Ong notes in Orality and Literacy (1982:37-
38) that primarily oral discourse is additive rather than subordinative in 
its use of grammatical structures. On these bases, one may generalize 
from James A. Notopoulos’ study of “Parataxis in Homer” (1949) 
and say that parataxis characterizes the primary oral mentality. This 
pervasive quality is manifested in paratactic grammatical structures, 
additive rhetorical structures, and episodic narrative structures.
Readers who are familiar with the Niceno-Constantinopolitan 
Creed of 381, which is used by contemporary Christians, can readily see 
how the heritage of the narrative and paratactic oral features of thought 
and expression carried over into this expression of the faith, and these 
readers will see the survival of this oral heritage in the Nicene Creed 
of 325 when I quote it and analyze it later in this essay. Of course, the 
Creed is a fi xed formulary expression, whereas truly oral (unwritten) 
formulary expressions are not fi xed, but fl uid or variable in the sense of 
being multiform in passing on “uniform” thought.
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Let us now turn to the Council of Nicea. Of course, there were 
both political and theological concerns that contributed to the formulation 
of the Nicene Creed of 325. The emperor Constantine the Great had 
made Christianity the favored faith of the empire. The doctrines of Arius 
had divided Christians, and Constantine saw this division as a threat 
to the stability and well-being of the empire. His attitude bespeaks a 
highly oral mentality: the primary oral mentality is essentially tribal in 
orientation, and tribalism is predicated on outward manifestations of 
unity and loyalty. This attribute of orality explains why the Christians 
as well as the Jews were earlier readily considered suspect and easy 
prey to persecution and why in the early fourth century division among 
Christians could be considered a threat to the outward unity of the empire 
by Constantine. The Nicene Creed of 325 was designed to squelch the 
Arians and restore unity, but the Arians later managed to interpret a key 
term in this creed (a seemingly unambiguous, very abstract philosophic 
term) in a concrete manner consistent with their own contentions so that 
the controversy over Arianism eventually raged on. This suggests that 
aside from the substance of the debated matter—the term homoousios, 
consubstantial—the Arians might be considered to be manifesting a 
primary oral mentality. With this possibility in mind, let us look at the 
text of the Nicene Creed of 325.
Kelly (1972:215-16) gives both the original Greek and an 
English translation of this creed. Here is the Greek text he gives with 
what I consider to be its formulary expressions arranged paratactically 
to illustrate one point mentioned above about primary oral composing 
practices:
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Of course, line divisions could be somewhat different for the English 
translation because English syntax is different from Greek syntax,5 
but the point is that formulary elements are obviously being used to 
compose this credal statement. The additive structures of primary 
orality are manifest in the translation as well as in the Greek original. 
Likewise, imagistic terms characteristic of primary orality abound in 
this credal statement (e.g., “Father” in line 2, “Son” in line 5, “Holy 
Spirit” in line 26, “almighty” in line 2, “begotten” in line 7, “light” in 
line 10), while the more abstract literate thought occurs in line 8 and 13. 
But the abstract terms are situated within a narrative structure which 
presumably would aid the memory of highly oral persons. Of course, 
the entire creed is structured around the formula used in baptizing in 
the name of the Father (lines 1-3) and of the Son (lines 4-26) and of the 
Holy Spirit (line 27). Except for lines 8 and 13, the formulary elements 
affi rmed in this creed are undoubtedly by-products of the oral
 EARLY CHRISTIAN CREEDS 141
tradition of Christianity. Some of the affi rmations about the Son are 
simply traditional Christian formulary expressions that were put in to 
fl atly contradict equally formulary expressions of Arius about the Son, 
and the anathema (lines 27-35) unequivocally rejects the formulaic 
expressions of the Arians (e.g., lines 29, 30).
With the advantage of hindsight, a Christian today could readily 
argue that the teachings of the Arians were not consonant with the 
threefold naming in the baptismal formula. Why name three in the 
baptismal formula if they are not distinct and yet also equal and at the 
same time one? But the Arian mind boggled at the idea of two (Father 
and Son) without one being subordinate to the other. Is it possible that 
the idea of equality of being implied between the Father and the Son 
(and the Holy Spirit) was somehow impossible for the highly oral mind 
to grasp? In other words, must one acquire literate thought to a certain 
degree in order to grasp the idea of equality implied here—allowing 
the possibility that grasping the idea implied here is tantamount to 
acquiring literate thought to a certain degree? This matter of degree 
needs to be carefully considered. We today speak in honorifi c terms of 
a person who is “highly literate” to praise someone who is well read to 
a superlative degree, and so there is a basis in our usage for speaking 
of the degree of literacy in persons. Moreover, I have regularly used 
the term “basically literate” in my articles to describe inner-city black 
open admissions students who have mastered the rudiments of reading 
and writing but who nevertheless come from a residual form of primary 
oral culture.6 Given my usage, I would say that Arius himself could 
have been basically literate but still highly oral in his thinking and 
therefore limited in his ability to understand abstract literate thought and 
perhaps thereby also limited in his potential ability to understand the 
relationship of equality between the Father and Son (and the Holy Spirit) 
implied in the threefold naming in the baptismal formula. Someone may 
argue against this interpretation by noting that Arius was educated and 
therefore literate beyond the rudimentary level. He was indeed educated 
in rhetoric, which is what education meant in his day (cf. Riché 1976, 
Kennedy 1980). Most likely, that education included some philosophy 
(or literate thought properly so called). But it undoubtedly also included 
training in the effective use of sound effects, rhythm, repetition, and 
other oral-acoustical dimensions of rhetoric. Since Arius became famous 
for teaching with clever ditties (that is,
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good-sounding formulary expressions), he obviously employed the oral-
acoustical dimensions of his education in rhetoric more conspicuously 
than the presumed philosophic (or properly literate) dimension.
However that may be, the Nicene Creed of 325 clearly employs 
abstract literate thought in lines 8 and 13 where the philosophic term 
“substance” is employed, and it is revealing that the Arians subsequently 
managed to interpret even this term in a very concrete way, even though 
St. Athanasius says that the formulators of the clauses thought that the 
clauses were unambiguous (Kelly 1972:213). It is also instructive to note 
that diehard Arian missionaries were later quite active in converting the 
barbarians to their kind of Christianity, for the barbarians were still by 
and large primary oral people. Since this is a very benign interpretation 
of the origins and the appeal of Arianism, it is important to recall that 
Arianism made Jesus Christ neither God nor man but a demigod, like 
a Homeric demigod, whereas orthodox Christianity eventually came to 
hold that Jesus Christ was both God and man. These insights about the 
divine and the human natures of Jesus Christ are undeniably important. 
Consequently, their denial in Arianism was rightly opposed.
If this analysis of Arianism as a manifestation of a residual 
form of the primary oral mentality resisting a formulation of the literate 
mentality can be accepted, then a similar analysis might be proposed to 
account for the similar resistance in the Pneumatomachian controversy 
to the proposed application of the abstract (or literate) term homoousios 
to the Holy Spirit. As a result of this controversy, the Creed of 325 was 
amended at the Council of Constantinople in 381. It is important to note 
that the formulary expressions added to the Creed about the Holy Spirit 
are all concrete terms. Kelly (341) notes that most of these expressions 
have scriptural fl avor: “the Lord” (2 Cor 3.17), “the giver of life” (Jn. 
6.63), “he proceeds from the Father” (Jn. 15.26), and “he spoke through 
the prophets” (2 Pet. 1.21). While “The Tome of Damasus,” which was 
probably composed around 377-78 and which was confi rmed by the 
General Council in Rome in 382, and “The Synodical Letter of the 
Council of Constantinople,” which was issued in 382 by the second 
council held in Constantinople,7 employed abstract terms to characterize 
the Holy Spirit (e.g., “equal,” “one divinity,” “only one true divinity,” 
and “of the divine substance” from the former document, and “the
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uncreated and consubstantial and coeternal Trinity” from the latter), 
Kelly notes that the Creed of 381 employed the language of St. 
Athanasius and St. Basil in the expression “who with the Father and the 
Son is together worshipped and together glorifi ed.” He rightly points out 
that this language was less offensive than other language already being 
used to characterize the Holy Spirit. The orality-literacy hypothesis 
now enables us to see that the language added to the Creed of 381 is 
concrete action-oriented language attuned to the primary oral mentality 
and that the other language in use at the time is abstract language of the 
kind fostered by vowelized literacy. Moreover, this hypothesis suggests 
that the abstract (or literate) language was offensive to certain people 
precisely because they were still deeply attuned to the primary oral 
mentality.
Someone might object that even a highly literate person could 
reject either the claim that Jesus Christ was of one substance with the 
Father or the claim that the Holy Spirit was of one substance with the 
Father and the Son, or both claims. Indeed, John Milton, whom Ong 
(1977b:189-212) considers to have interiorized literacy extremely 
deeply, is known for his Arianism. Of course, being highly literate does 
not necessarily mean that the Christian believer will grasp and assent 
to the doctrine that the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are of one 
divine substance and equal. But that is not the question raised in this 
essay. In other words, I do not treat the question of being literate as 
a suffi cient condition for grasping abstract thought. Rather, the essay 
suggests that being literate is a necessary but not suffi cient condition 
for grasping abstract thought. Now someone else might ask if this 
means that a person must be literate in order to be a Christian. Since one 
becomes a Christian by being baptized, the above summary of Kelly’s 
account of the history of baptism should indicate that one does not need 
to be literate in order to be baptized and thereby become a Christian. 
Moreover, one does not need to be literate to remember and recite the 
Creed of 381, and one does not necessarily need to grasp the meaning of 
homoousios in the Creed of 381 in order to be a faithful Christian. But 
it may deepen one’s faith if one does come to understand the meaning 
of homoousios as well as a number of other abstract concepts which 
developed over the centuries, and to the extent that one does understand 
them one may be said to be literate.8
In The Presence of the Word (1967), Ong raises the question
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of why divine providence chose the time it did to enter human history. 
I might close with a bit of speculation about this point based on the 
foregoing analyses: the primary oral mentality probably still had to be 
strong for people to believe in Jesus Christ, and yet the literate mentality 
probably had to be developed and waiting in the wings, so to speak, in 
order to eventually help make as understandable as a mystery can be, 
how the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are one and yet distinct, 
as the threefold naming in the baptismal formula implies.
Regis College
University of Toronto
Notes
1Of course, Lord’s book stimulated considerable subsequent research. For example, 
Berkley Peabody (1975) has provided a detailed study of orality in Hesiod, while Michael N. 
Nagler (1974) has produced an insightful generative theory of Homeric oral composition which 
may be helpful in understanding oral composition in other languages. In addition, John Miles 
Foley annotates some 1800 items in more than 90 language areas in his bibliography of Oral-
Formulaic Theory and Research (1985). Moreover, Parry’s attention to oral tradition as such 
deeply influenced the phenomenological studies of primary orality and literacy offered by Ong 
(1967, 1971, 1977, 1982), Havelock (1963, 1978, 1982, 1983a, 1983b), and Marshall McLuhan 
(1962). Their works in turn have influenced to one degree or another the analyses of historical 
phenomena presented by Frans Josef van Beeck, S.J. (1979), Werner H. Kelber (1983), Pheme 
Perkins (1980), M. T. Clanchy (1979), Brian Stock (1983) Elizabeth Eisenstein (1979), and 
Kevin B. Maxwell, S.J. (1983).
2For an extensive discussion of the nuances of this claim, see Farrell 1986.
3I would suggest that literary studies such as Chaucer’s Use of Proverbs (Whiting 
1934), Proverbs in Earlier English Drama (Whiting 1938), Elizabethan Proverb Lore in 
Lyly’s Euphues and in Fettle’s Petite Pallace (Tilley 1926), Spenser’s Proverb Lore (Smith 
1970), and Shakespeare’s Proverbial Language (Dent 1981) need to be considered in the 
light of Ong’s insight about the attraction of formulary expressions for highly oral people. Of 
course, not only primary oral people generated formulary expressions. Essentially literate but 
still highly oral people produced learned formulary expressions such as sententiae (e.g., Smith 
1970). Moreover, if one considers Peter Lombard’s Sentences (cf. Ong 1958:57) to be learned 
formulary expressions writ large, so to speak, then one might wonder if Erasmus’ antipathy to the 
schoolboy scholasticism of his day was due in part to the formulary nature of the teachings.
4Concerning the concreteness of this term, see Grillmeier 1975:126 and
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elsewhere.
5To illustrate the point, here is a comparable division of the English
translation provided by Kelly:
1 We believe in one God
2  the Father almighty
3  maker of all things visible and invisible;
4 And in our Lord Jesus Christ,
5  the Son of God,
6  begotten from the Father,
7  only-begotten,
8  that is, from the substance of the Father,
9  God from God,
10  light from light,
11  true God from true God,
12  begotten not made,
13  of one substance with the Father,
14  through Whom all things came into being,
15  things in heaven
16  and things on earth,
17  Who because of us men
18  and because of our salvation
19  came down
20  and became incarnate,
21  becoming man,
22  suffered
23  and rose again on the third day,
24  ascended to the heavens,
25  will come to judge
26  the living 
27  and the dead;
28 And in the Holy Spirit.
29 But as for those who say,
30  There was when he was not,
31  and, Before being born He was not,
32  and that He came into existence out of nothing,
33  or who assert that the Son of God is of a different 
  hypostasis or substance,
34  or is subject to alteration or change—
35  these the Catholic
36  and apostolic Church
37  anathemizes.
6See Farrell 1972, 1974, 1976-77, 1978, 1979, 1983.
7Cf. Burns and Fagin 1984:150ff. for these texts in English.
8The author wishes to thank Frans Jozef van Beeck, S.J., Mary T. Malone, and John 
P. Egan, S.J., for their helpful comments on this essay.
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